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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
1. What is “the basis for the assertion of FISC subject matter jurisdiction over” 
Movants’ claim? Specifically, 
(a) Is there a “statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction over a constitutional 
claim for access to judicial opinions”? 
(b) Are there “any other authorities supporting Movants’ assertion of FISC 
subject matter jurisdiction over their claim including, in particular, any case 
law addressing the inherent authority of a court of limited or specialized 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims falling outside the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, as explicitly granted by statute”? 
2. To what extent do Movants have a qualified First Amendment right of access to 
judicial opinions? 
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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Laura K. Donohue is the Agnes N. Williams Research Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University Law Center, Director of the Center on National Security and 
the Law, Director of the Center on Privacy and Technology, and Senior Scholar at 
the Center for the Constitution. She holds her Ph.D. in History from the University 
of Cambridge, England, her J.D. (with Distinction) from Stanford Law School, and 
her A.B. (with Honors) in Philosophy from Dartmouth College. On November 25, 
2015, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) designated her as eligible 
to serve as amicus curiae pursuant to 50 U.S.C. §1803 (i)(1). On January 9, 2018, 
consistent with 50 U.S.C. §1803(i)(2)(A), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review (FISCR) appointed her as amicus curiae in this case to address the 
question of standing. Order of Jan. 9, 2018, FISCR 18-01. FISCR held that Movants 
had met the standing requirements and returned the case to address subject matter 
jurisdiction and to address the motion on the merits. In re: Certification of Questions 
of Law to the FISCR, FISCR No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 16, 2018), at 7-8 
[hereinafter FISCR Op.]. On May 1, 2018, the FISC appointed her as amicus curiae 
to address the remaining matters before the Court. [hereinafter Br. Order]
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Neither Congress nor the executive can preclude Article III courts from fulfilling 
their constitutional role. The national legislature has broad power to determine 
whether to establish lower courts and to define, within the categories of the cases 
defined in Article III, the kinds of cases those courts can entertain. But once 
Congress has called an Article III court into existence and defined its subject matter 
jurisdiction, Congress cannot prevent it from exercising its core judicial function. 
The judicial power is the power to decide cases. Young v. United States ex rel. 
Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 816, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). The final 
determination and the reasoning leading to it are beyond the reach of the other 
branches. If it were otherwise, then the careful protections built into the U.S. 
Constitution to create three, co-equal branches would be for naught. 
This distinction, between an appropriate statutory assignment of subject matter 
jurisdiction and the constitutional requirements at the heart of separation of powers, 
illuminates the questions set by the court. The first query, whether there is a 
“statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction over…access to judicial opinions” 
assumes that Congress can preclude public access to the output of the judicial 
process. Br. Order at 1. It cannot. It is undisputed that FISC is an Article III court. 
As soon as Congress brought it into being and granted it jurisdiction over domestic 
electronic surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purposes, it divested itself 
 2 
 
of interference in the court’s core powers—including, most particularly, the court’s 
decisions, reasoning, and issuance of opinions on matters properly before it. 
The second question requests “any case law addressing the inherent authority of 
a court of limited or specialized jurisdiction to adjudicate claims falling outside the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, as explicitly granted by statute.” Br. Order at 2. 
All Article III courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Bender v. Williamsport Area 
Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). There are three Article III courts, aside from 
FISC and FISCR, with specialized subject matter. See App. A 10-17, 32-36. But 
specialization says nothing about the inherent powers of lower federal courts qua 
Article III bodies. Congress cannot control matters central to the administration of 
justice. “Certain implied powers…necessarily result to our Courts of justice from 
the nature of their institution,” powers “which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, 
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.” United States v. Hudson, 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). It would be hard to imagine a more fundamental 
violation of that constitutional principle than efforts by the executive, or Congress, 
to claim that the Court has no jurisdiction over questions concerning public access 
to its own opinions, and that the other branches have the right to regulate the court’s 
decisions and to prevent citizens from seeing the results of the judicial process.  
The final matter on which the Court invites discussion goes to the merits. 
Movants seek access to judicial opinions that carry the force of law. They involve 
 3 
 
complex constitutional and statutory interpretations which daily impact millions of 
citizens’ lives. The cases reveal illegal government behavior. The opinions, of which 
there are now more than 60 in the public domain, serve as precedent. Movants 
therefore have a common law and a First Amendment right of access to them. Brief 
of Amicus Curiae, In re: Certification of Questions of Law to the FISCR, FISCR 
Docket No. 18-01 (Feb. 23, 2018), at 3-24. This brief advances the conversation by 
urging the court to adopt the test followed by other Article III courts which routinely 
subject classification claims to scrutiny. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under separation of powers doctrine, Congress lacks the authority to pass statutes to 
grant, or deny, the FISC jurisdiction over its opinions. All three branches agree that 
FISC is an Article III court. Constitutional courts are vested with “the judicial 
power” of the United States, which is insulated from the other two branches. It 
includes the power to issue opinions disposing of cases. If the other branches could 
strip the courts of authority over their judgments, they would be able to manipulate 
the law, undermining the protections for judicial independence. The “least dangerous 
branch” would lose all power. All it has is its judgments on matters of law. 
In 2007 this Court correctly held that it has inherent authority over its own 
records. In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d 484, 486-87 
(FISA Ct. 2007). Congress has broad authority to set the court’s subject matter 
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jurisdiction. While specialized, FISC is an Article III court. Article III courts have 
essential inherent powers that stem from their responsibility to administer justice. 
Hundreds of cases recognize such authorities. See App. B 52-70. To the extent that 
inherent powers may be merely useful or beneficial, courts can take the initiative but 
then must give way to legislative direction. Insofar as inherent powers are essential 
or necessary to the execution of core judicial power, then Congress cannot interfere. 
ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 255-56 (4th Cir. 2011); In re Stone, 986 F.2d 898, 
901-902 (5th Cir. 1993); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562-63 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (en banc). Issuance of opinions is a core judicial power. Control over 
them is an essential inherent authority. Article III courts thus have authority over 
their own records. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
Courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over third party requests. They continue to 
exercise this authority, without any statutory authorization, even decades after the 
underlying action ends. See, e.g., United States v. Bus. of Custer Battlefield Museum 
& Stores, 658 F.3d 1188, 1192-96 (9th Cir. 2011); Chicago Tribune Co. v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1310-1313 (11th Cir. 2001); In re 
Petition of American Historical Association, 49 F.Supp.2d 274, 295 (1999).  The 
court in which the matter first occurred exercises jurisdiction. 
The FISC has a critical role to play in determining which parts of its opinions 
should be withheld from the public. The court is not unique in dealing with classified 
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matters. Article III courts confront, scrutinize and reject Executive Branch claims. 
See App. C 76-96. To the extent that the executive attempts to masque matters of 
law, it grossly overreaches. For matters of fact, the FISC should apply the test used 
by other Article III courts, taking into account reasonableness, good faith, 
specificity, and plausibility. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CONGRESS CAN NEITHER GRANT NOR DENY THE FISC 
JURISDICTION OVER ITS OWN OPINIONS.  
A. The FISC is an Article III court. 
 
Congress created the FISC as an Article III constitutional court.1 Congress continues 
to regard it as an Article III court.2 Every court, including this one, to confront the 
question of whether the FISC is an Article III court has answered in the affirmative.3  
B. Article III courts are vested with “the judicial power” of the United States. 
 
                                                 
1 Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Legis. of the Permanent Select Comm. on Intell., 95th Cong. 26-31, 116, (1978). 
2 See 154 Cong. Rec. 804 (Jan. 24, 2008). See also Andrew Nolan & Richard M. 
Thompson II, Cong. Research Serv., R43746, Congressional Power to Create 
Federal Courts: A Legal Overview (2014). 
3 FISCR Op. at 8; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731-32 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) 
(per curiam); United States v. Cavanaugh, 807 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1987); In re 
Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk Collection of Data Under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc. 13-08, 2017 WL 427591, at *3 
(FISA Ct. Jan. 25, 2017); In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 
2d  at 486; In re Kevork, 634 F. Supp. 1002, 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 788 F.2d 
566 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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The Constitution provides for “the judicial power of the United States” to “be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish.” Art. III, §1. Congress, in turn, may “constitute Tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court.” Art. I, §8. According to the Supreme Court, courts  
established under the specific power given in section 2 of Article III are called 
constitutional courts. They share in the exercise of the judicial power defined in that 
section, can be invested with no other jurisdiction, and have judges who hold office 
during good behavior, with no power in Congress to provide otherwise.  
 
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929). Whether a court is Article III 
turns, first, on whether it satisfies the structural requirements of unity, supremacy, 
and inferiority within the judicial branch. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, 
Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 
643, 649 (2004). See App. A 2-4. Second, the statute creating it must comply with 
the requirements of good behavior, compensation, and case-or-controversy. Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion); App. A 4-6.  
Certain courts that do not meet these requirements are considered alternately 
“non-constitutional,” “legislative,” or “Article I” courts. App. A 6-7. They are 
created by Congress in the exertion of other powers....Their functions always are 
directed to the execution of one or more of such powers, and are prescribed by 
Congress independently of section 2 of Article III; and their judges hold for such 
term as Congress prescribes, whether it be a fixed period of years or during good 
behavior.  
 
Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 449. Such courts 
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are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the 
Constitution on the general government can be deposited…They are legislative 
courts....The jurisdiction with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial 
power which is defined in the 3d Article of the Constitution, but is conferred by 
Congress, in the execution of those general powers which that body possesses. 
 
Am. Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton (Canter), 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).4 This 
distinction matters: non-constitutional courts do not exercise the judicial power of 
the United States. Article III constitutional courts do. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 
462, 494-95 (2011). 
C. The judicial power cannot be exercised by the political branches. 
 
The U.S. Constitution, which does not elaborate on “the judicial power,” reflects 
English history and common law and augments it in important ways. Felix 
Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal 
Contempts in “inferior” Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1010, 1017 (1924). In England, the judicial power was subservient to the 
Crown, but distinct.5 The Courts of the Exchequer, Common Pleas, King’s Bench, 
and Chancery were imbued with the powers of the sovereign.6 Despite being rooted 
                                                 
4 See also The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1879); Good v. Martin, 95 U.S. 
90, 98 (1877); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1873); Clinton v. 
Englebrecht, 80 U.S. 434, 447 (1871); Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. 235, 242 (1850).  
5 See J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (2d ed. 1979); L.B. 
Curzon, English Legal History (1968); 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William 
Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2d ed. 1968). 
6 See 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23-24 (“[A]ll courts of justice, which 
are the medium by which [the king] administers the laws, are derived from the power 
of the crown…. [Judicial power] is only an emanation of the royal prerogative.”) 
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in the Crown’s prerogative, judicial power became increasingly independent. The 
Act of Settlement guaranteed tenure during good behavior and fixed salaries for 
judges, who exercised their power through a judicial function: applying law to fact 
and issuing judgments. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2, §3 (1701); 1 W.S. 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 195 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 
7th ed. 1956); 1 Blackstone, supra, at *267-70. The courts had the authority to 
regulate proceedings, decide cases, provide for business, punish misconduct, and 
supervise inferior tribunals. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal 
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 809-16 (2001). No 
statute was required for judges to undertake these tasks, or to adjudicate cases and 
issue opinions detailing their reasoning. It was part and parcel of the judicial power. 
The United States adopted some aspects of the judicial power and introduced new 
authorities and protections. Colonists saw access to common law as a right. See U.S. 
Declaration of Rights, §5 (1774) (“That the respective colonies are entitled to the 
common law of England.”) The inclusion of the terms “law” and “equity” into the 
Constitution became “links in a chain binding out American courts to the institutions 
of Blackstone, Mansfield, Hale, Roll, Ellsmere, Coke, Bracton, Glanvil, and the 
barons at Runnymead.” Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court 
Affecting Procedure, 22 Wash. U. L.Q. 459, 490 (1937). The Founders transferred 
common law to the nascent institutions. John Jay, as Chief Justice, announced, 
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“[T]his court consider[s] the practice of the courts of king's bench, and of chancery, 
in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, 
from time to time, make such alterations therein as circumstances may render 
necessary.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xvi, 2 L. ed. 11 (1791). 
Americans also departed from their English heritage by instituting a fully 
independent, co-equal judicial branch. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
219-23 (1995). The grant of power flowed directly from the people, strengthening 
the courts’ core powers.7 “This separation is not merely a matter of convenience or 
of governmental mechanism. Its object is basic and vital; namely, to preclude a 
commingling of…essentially different powers of government in the same hands.” 
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (citation omitted). The 
Framers specifically directed that the courts “should be free from the remotest 
                                                 
7 Alexander Hamilton looked to separation of powers as a “wholly new discover[y]” 
in the “science of politics” that enabled self-government. The Federalist No. 9, at 72 
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). See also id., No. 51 (James Madison); id., No. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton). Madison ruminated: “No political truth is certainly of greater 
intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of 
liberty.” Id. No. 47, at 301. “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands…may justly be pronounced the very definition of 
tyranny.” Id. Accordingly, “The functions of government under our system are 
apportioned. To the legislative department has been committed the duty of making 
laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of 
interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the 
courts…[N]either department may invade the province of the other, and neither may 
control, direct or restrain the action of the other.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 488 (1923). See also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000). 
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influence, direct or indirect, of either of the other two powers.” 1 James De Witt 
Andrews, The Works of James Wilson 299 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) 
(1804). They rejected the idea that the legislature could control the judicial power in 
any way. Delegates at the convention voted down the proposal to add a clause: “In 
all the other cases before mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised in such 
manner as the Legislature shall direct.” 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787 425, 431 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). “A clearer rejection of congressional 
authority over judicial powers is hard to imagine.” Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory 
View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding 
of Article III, 132 Pa. L. Rev. 741, 791 (1984). The founders further ensured judicial 
independence with the good behavior and compensation clauses. There would have 
been no reason to do this if there were no powers reserved for the courts, conveyed 
through the grant of the judicial power. “[W]here Art. III does apply, all of the 
legislative powers specified in Art. I and elsewhere are subject to it.” N. Pipeline v. 
Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. 50, 73 (1982) (Brennan, J.). 
D. The judicial power includes the power to dispose of cases. 
 
As recognized from the earliest days of the Republic, it is within the purview of the 
judiciary to dispose of cases. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must 
of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
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Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Adjudication entails applying law to the facts of the case, 
before rendering a final, binding judgment. Once this process is put into motion, 
Congress and the executive cannot interfere. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 128 (1871). Nor can they insert themselves into the process after the fact. 
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1892). See also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 217-18. If 
the political branches could interfere, not just by overturning the court’s final 
judgment but by stripping the court of authority over its own opinions, it would 
render the independence of the judiciary of no consequence. It would not matter 
what the Court said or did. All the courts have is their judgment as to matters of law. 
If their determinations could be seized and buried, they would cease to have the force 
of law, undermining the courts’ basic adjudicatory function. The legislature cannot, 
as a constitutional matter, use a statutory provision to interfere with an Article III 
court’s control over its own opinions. The source of the court’s power is 
constitutional. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77, 180. “[I]f a case involved 
an executive effort to extend a law beyond its meaning, judges would have a duty to 
adhere to the law that had been properly promulgated under the Constitution.” Perez 
v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1220 (2015).  
II. THE FISC HAS ESSENTIAL INHERENT AUTHORITY OVER ITS OWN 
RECORDS. 
The FISC has asked us to provide “any case law addressing the inherent authority of 
a court of limited or specialized jurisdiction to adjudicate claims falling outside the 
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court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Br. Order at 2. All federal courts are courts of 
limited jurisdiction.8 “[T]he power which congress possess to create Courts of 
inferior jurisdiction, necessarily implies the power to limit the jurisdiction of those 
Courts to particular objects.” Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33. Specialization does 
nothing to alter the FISC’s status as an Article III court. As such, upon its creation, 
Congress vested the FISC with certain inherent powers. In re Motion for Release of 
Court Records, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87. In reviewing applications, “The FISA 
court retains all of the inherent powers that any court has when considering a 
warrant. There is no delegation of judicial power to the Executive Branch.” In re 
Kevork, 634 F. Supp. at 1014. In drafting opinions, an action contemplated by 
Congress, the FISC has the inherent power of any Article III court. See 50 U.S.C. 
§§1803(a)(1), 1803(b) (2012). “Every court has supervisory power over its own 
records and files.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. Accord Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 
377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.. v. Federal 
Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983). “[FISC’s] inherent power over 
its records [therefore] supplies the authority to consider a claim of legal right to 
release of those records.” In re Motion for Release of Court Records, 526 F.Supp.2d 
                                                 
8 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906-07 (2018); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 
251, 256-58 (2013); Bender, 475 U.S. at 541; Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 
374 (1978); Owen Equip. & Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922); 
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173-80; Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 
10 (1799). 
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at 487. “Courts invested with the judicial power of the United States have certain 
inherent authority to protect their proceedings and judgments in the course of 
discharging their traditional responsibilities.” Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 
823 (1996). The FISC had subject matter jurisdiction over the four cases in which 
the opinions were issued. See 50 U.S.C. §§1841-46, 1861-64. It therefore has the 
authority to hear motions seeking their disclosure.  
A. Article III courts have essential inherent powers. 
 
All three branches have what are variously called “inherent,” “implied,” “essential,” 
or “incidental” powers, which are authorities necessary to the performance of 
express constitutional powers. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 647 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). They adhere to an office by 
nature of its function. The Founders universally agreed on their existence. Hamilton 
ruminated on the “striking absurdity” of a government unable to exercise its 
necessary implied authority. The Federalist No. 21, at 139 (Clinton Rossiter ed. 
1961). See also id., No. 44 (James Madison); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 409 (1819). 
1. Inherent judicial powers stem from the courts’ role of administering justice. 
Early on, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of inherent judicial powers 
that lie beyond the reach of Congress. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 
93-94 (1807); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 433 (1793) (Iredell, J., 
dissenting). In 1812, the Court held that “[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily 
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result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.” Hudson, 11 U.S. 
(7 Cranch) at 34. “[N]ot immediately derived from statute,” such powers also could 
not “be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all 
others.” Id. Jurisdiction stemmed from “[the] creation” of a court. Id. at 33. 
[U]pon the formation of any political body, an implied power to preserve its own 
existence and promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results to 
it….[T]hat is a principle by no means peculiar to the common law. It is coeval, 
probably, with the first formation of a limited Government, belongs to a system of 
universal law.  
 
Id. at 33-34. The Court has since repeatedly recognized its inherent powers.9 As a 
matter of longstanding common law, they stem from the administration of justice.10 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a test for what constitutes an inherent power. 
Nevertheless, hundreds of cases illuminate the range of inherent authorities 
acknowledged by the courts. App. B 52-70. They divide into three categories: the 
power to (a) ensure fairness, (b) facilitate efficient processes, and (c) protect the 
integrity, independence, and reputation of the judiciary. Id. On their own authority, 
courts, for instance, can appoint auditors, special masters, and commissioners; order 
discovery procedures; require production of witness statements; and issue in limine 
                                                 
9 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 
(1962). See also App. B. 
10 See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924); In re Peterson, 253 
U.S. 300, 312 (1920); In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 902; Clark v. Austin, 101 S.W. 2d 
977, 997 (Mo. 1937); In re Richards, 63 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Mo. 1933); App. B 52, 
n.16. 
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rulings.11 Courts can seal, unseal, revoke, or rescind orders.12 They can consolidate 
cases and stay actions pending completion of a related action in another court.13 And 
they can prevent fraud on the court and sanction contumacious behavior.14 
Not all of the judiciary’s inherent powers are limited to matters still in dispute. 
Courts allow post-trial depositions. See United States ex rel. Consol. Elec. Distribs., 
Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 929 F.2d 1089, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1991). Similarly, “[A] 
protective order, like any ongoing injunction, is always subject to the inherent power 
of the district court to relax or terminate the order, even after judgment.” Poliquin v. 
Garden Way, Inc. 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993).15 A court “can modify a 
protective order when a third-party requests judicial documents after the parties have 
filed a stipulation of dismissal.” Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141. A “court may order that 
a filing be made under seal…[and] may later unseal the filing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
                                                 
11 See, e.g., Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); Harris v. Nelson, 394 
U.S. 286, 290 (1969); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957); In re 
Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312-14 (1920); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127-
29 (1864). 
12 See, e.g., Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (1961) (Mem.). 
13 See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936); Bowen v. Chase, 94 U.S. 
812, 824 (1876). 
14 See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haegar, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017); 
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 765-66; Link, 370 U.S. at 
633; Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946). 
15 See also United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991) (“As long as a protective order 
remains in effect, the court that entered the order retains the power to modify it, even 
if the underlying suit has been dismissed.”). 
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5.2(d); United States v. Seugasala, 670 F. App’x 641, 641 (9th Cir. 2016) (Mem.). 
Courts can rescind jury discharge orders. Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016). 
Courts retain the power to punish for contempt. Young, 481 U.S. at 798. “There can 
be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance” after the 
conclusion of a case. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). Courts 
also have inherent powers over matters that have never been before them. For 
instance, they can answer letters rogatory. In re Letter Rogatory, 523 F.2d 562, 564 
(6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Reagan, 453 F.2d 165, 173 (6th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Staples, 256 F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1958). They can bind and be bound by 
decisions of other courts, ensuring stare decisis as a matter of vertical and horizontal 
parity. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). Courts have inherent power to 
regulate bar admission and the practice of law. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
529, 531 (1824). Cf. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 42-43; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 
764. And the judiciary can sanction individuals for unauthorized legal practice. See 
United States v. Johnson, 327 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2003).  
2. Essential inherent powers are distinguishable from those that are merely 
beneficial.  
The Supreme Court, which recognizes the judiciary’s inherent powers, treats each 
case individually. Lower courts, looking to the Court’s holdings in each context and 
to decisions of other courts, divide inherent powers into three categories: irreducible 
inherent authority, “essential” inherent powers, and authorities merely “useful” or 
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“beneficial” to the administration of justice. See Holder, 673 F.3d at 255-56; In re 
Stone, 986 F.2d at 901-02; Eash, 757 F.2d at 562-63; United States v. Brainer, 691 
F.2d 691, 695-96 (4th Cir. 1982). Powers in the first two categories are beyond the 
reach of Congress.  
The first category delineates powers that are “so fundamental to the essence of a 
court as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within 
this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms ‘court’ and ‘judicial 
power.’” Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. Once a court has been brought into being, Article 
III vests it with certain authorities. “Within the scope of these powers, the other 
branches of government may not interfere; any legislation purporting to regulate 
these inherent powers would be invalid as an unconstitutional violation of the 
doctrine of separation of powers.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 901.16 
For the second category, essential inherent powers, the standard set by Hudson is 
one of indispensable necessity—i.e., those powers “necessary to the exercise of all 
others.” 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34.17 Contempt provides a good example. Since the 
founding, there has been extensive legislation governing it. See Judiciary Act of 
1789, ch. 20, §17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. Nevertheless, there are early and repeated 
                                                 
16 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146-47. 
17 See also Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764; In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 
(1888). 
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discussion of the court’s contempt powers.18 Whatever the legislature may try to do, 
it cannot divest the judiciary of this power. Because essential inherent powers flow 
from necessity, they can “neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative” 
by Congress. Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66.19 
The third category “implicates powers necessary only in the practical sense of 
being useful.” Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. It derives from the fact that Congress cannot 
envision every tool that the courts might need to undertake their tasks; therefore, the 
judiciary can act until the legislature decides to invalidate such actions.20 “This third 
category of inherent power has sometimes been said to be ‘rooted in the notion that 
a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a 
Chancery Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation 
to a just and equitable conclusion.’ Eash, 757 F.2d at 562 (quoting ITT Cmty. Dev. 
Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978).”  
B. Authority over judicial records is an essential inherent power. 
The Constitution does not expressly assign the power to issue opinions to any 
department. In the absence of an express grant of authority, control must be exercised 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873); Anderson v. 
Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34. See 
also United States v. Duane, 25 F. Cas. 920, 922 (C.C.D. Pa. 1801) (No. 14,997). 
19 See also Eash, 757 F.2d at 562; Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1959); 
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925); Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 65; Myers 
v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924); Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 226.  
20 See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); Alyeska Pipeline 
Service v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 (1975) 
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by the department to which it naturally belongs. “The judicial department is invested 
with jurisdiction in certain specified cases, in all of which it has the power to render 
judgment.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1825). “Courts have 
recognized that a judicial opinion deciding a case lies at the heart of the exercise of 
Article III powers.” Doe v. Apfel, No. 98-CV-182, 1999 WL 182669, at *3 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 1999). “The whole work done by the judges constitutes the 
authentic exposition and interpretation of the law.” Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 
244, 253 (1888). Congress cannot dictate to the Courts how to decide cases, and it 
can neither require a court to issue, nor forbid the court from issuing, a decision. 
Perhaps the most famous case comes from Justice Stephen Field, with whom 
Chief Justice Terry (on this occasion) agreed. California had adopted a statute 
saying, “that all opinions given upon an appeal in any Appellate Court of this State, 
shall be in writing, with the reason therefor, and filed with the Clerk of the Court.” 
1854 Cal. Stats. 72. The state Supreme Court ruled it unconstitutional: 
The Legislature can no more require this Court to state the reasons of its decisions, 
than this Court can require, for the validity of the statutes, that the Legislature shall 
accompany them with the reasons for their enactment. The principles of law settled 
are to be extracted from the records of the cases in which the decisions are rendered.  
 
Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 25 (1859) (Field, J.). The legislature was trying to 
usurp judicial power: “To accede to it any obligatory force would be to sanction a 
most palpable encroachment upon the independence of this department.” Id. 
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If the power of the Legislature to prescribe the mode and manner in which the 
Judiciary shall discharge their official duties be once recognized, there will be no 
limit to the dependence of the latter. If the Legislature can require the reasons of our 
decisions to be stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in writing, and enforce 
their oral announcement, or prescribe the paper upon which they shall be written, 
and the ink which shall be used. And yet no sane man will justify any such absurd 
pretension, but where is the limit to this power if its exercise in any particular be 
admitted? The truth is, no such power can exist in the Legislative Department, 
or be sanctioned by any Court which has the least respect for its own dignity 
and independence. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). The constitutional duty of the Court was “discharged by the 
rendition of decisions.” Id. While the legislature might have the right to regulate 
jurisdiction, “it cannot destroy” the court’s authority to “exercise the jurisdiction 
conferred.” Carter v. Commonwealth, 32 S.E. 780, 785 (Va. 1899). 
If the issuance of judicial opinions is a core judicial power, then control over 
those opinions must be an essential inherent power. Should it be otherwise, it would 
undermine the role of the courts in adjudicating cases. “Courts of record can speak 
only by or through their records, and what does not so appear does not exist in law.” 
20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §22 (2018). “The court record is the permanent account of 
that court’s proceedings in particular cases, as well as the court’s opinion or 
decision.” Id. If the other branches could divest the courts of ownership over their 
records, they could alter the principles of law according to their own interests. 
Accordingly, courts recognize their inherent authority “to protect their proceedings 
and judgments in the course of discharging their traditional responsibilities.” Degen 
v. United States, 517 U.S. at 823. They have the power “to protect the efficient and 
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orderly administration of justice and those necessary to command respect for the 
court’s orders, judgments, procedures, and authorities.” In re Stone, 986 F.2d at 902.  
1. Courts routinely exercise jurisdiction over third party requests for 
records. 
 
Courts control their own records. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-98; Gambale, 377 F.3d at 
140; Brown, 710 F.2d at 1177. They routinely exercise jurisdiction over third party 
motions for common law or First Amendment right of access to court documents—
ranging from applications for warrants to judicial opinions.21 The tipping point is 
whether the records are “judicial documents,” understood as materials that go to “the 
exercise of Article III judicial power.” United States v. Amodeo (Amodeo II), 71 F.3d 
1044, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1995). The moment at which they become so, the public has 
a presumptive right of access through the court in which they were filed. See, e.g., 
Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119; Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1048-52; Stern v. Cosby, 529 
F.Supp.2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). In none of the cases in which the Courts have 
entertained requests for their records has Congress made a statutory grant of power 
to the courts over the records in question. Nevertheless, the Courts consider such 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265-68 (4th Cir. 2014); Nixon, 435 
U.S. 589; United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 56-59 (1st Cir. 2013); Lugosch v. 
Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119-124, 126 (2d Cir. 2006); In re 
Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 9-13 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. Corbitt, 
879 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 
1986); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1107-1113 (3d Cir. 1985); Belo Broad. 
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers (In re 
Nat’l Broad. Co.), 635 F.2d 945, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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requests well within their power. These cases include materials deep in litigation22—
to say nothing of the final judgment of the court.  
2. Courts continue to exercise jurisdiction after the conclusion of the matter 
before the court. 
 
Courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over their records and opinions after the 
conclusion of the matter before the court.23 They have “the inherent power to correct 
errors, remedy omissions, and correct clerical errors in its records.” 20 Am. Jur. 2d 
Courts §25 (2018). They have the “power to modify or lift protective orders that 
[have been] entered.” In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d 
Cir. 1987). They can unseal records after the fact. See Doe, 749 F.3d at 252-53; 
Oregonion Pub. Co. v. U.S. District Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1468 (9th Cir. 1990). 
They can re-open a case. See United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 201 (2d Cir. 
2005). “The jurisdiction of a Court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, 
but continues.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 23-24. Courts can punish those who 
might “disregard…the product of their functioning, their judgments.” Young, 481 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 868 F.3d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 
2017) (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to determine whether a 
common law qualified right of access extended to pre-indictment search materials). 
23 See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 853 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2017) (A court “has the 
power to manage its records, even though the proceeding that generated those 
records has concluded.”); Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 
2010) (“That the court loses jurisdiction over the litigation does not, however, 
deprive the district court of its inherent supervisory powers.” (citing Cooter & Gell 
v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990)). 
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U.S. at 787, 821 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Third parties seek 
and are granted access to judicial documents after the underlying matter concludes.24 
None of these cases rely on statutory authorities. They rely on Article III inherent 
powers. Some go so far as to recognize it even when it conflicts with the statutorily-
derived rules. See, e.g., In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997). In 
one case, historians filed a motion requesting that a court unseal grand jury 
transcripts from an Espionage Act case seventy years prior. Carlson v. United States, 
837 F.3d 753, 757-61 (7th Cir. 2016). The district court regarded the request as well 
within its power. Id. On appeal, the court noted that “Every federal court to consider 
the issue” has determined that “a district court’s limited inherent power to supervise 
a grand jury includes the power to unseal grand-jury materials when appropriate.” 
Id. at 755-56. The plaintiff chose the Northern District of Illinois,  
because it was the court that originally had supervisory jurisdiction over the grand 
jury in question. He argued that this same court has continuing common-law 
authority over matters pertaining to that grand jury.  
 
Id. at 757 (emphasis added). It did not matter that Carlson had no connection to the 
underlying action. Id. at 759. “Representatives of the press and general public must 
be given an opportunity to be heard on the question of…access to documents. Id. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979); Custer, 658 
F.3d at 1192-96; Chicago, 263 F.3d at 1310-13; In re Nat’l Sec. Archive, No. 08 Civ. 
6599, 2008 WL 8985358, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2008); In re Petition of Am. 
Historical Ass’n, 49 F. Supp. at 295. See also App. B. 
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(quoting Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000). “To hold otherwise 
would raise First Amendment concerns.” Id. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 672 F.2d 
1289, 1294 (7th Cir. 1982). The line is the point at which the documents become 
part of the judicial record.  
III. THE FISC HAS A CRITICAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DETERMINING 
WHAT INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ITS OPINIONS SHOULD BE 
MADE PUBLICLY AVAILABLE. 
In 1971, the executive tried to assert absolute power over classified material essential 
to the administration of justice. The court rejected the government’s argument: 
The government's position…is that this determination by the executive official is 
conclusive upon the court, and the court has no judicial authority to require the 
production of the documents in the possession of an executive department, once the 
head of that department has filed this formal claim of privilege. Government counsel 
further asserts that this executive determination is conclusive…even where the 
document is such that the court may readily separate factual material to be disclosed 
to the other party from the kind of recommendations and discussion that would be 
an integral part of the decision-making process.  
 
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F. 2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). The D.C. Circuit stated, “In our view, this claim of absolute immunity for 
documents in possession of an executive department or agency, upon the bald 
assertion of its head, is not sound law.” Seaborg, 463 F. 2d at 792 (emphasis added). 
Once again, the executive is attempting to convince the court that it has no role 
to play in scrutinizing executive assertions of power over materials central to the 
judicial function. To support its claim, the government misconstrues Department of 
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), as standing for the proposition that the 
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executive has complete control of classified information, and that the judiciary is ill-
suited to make national security judgments.25 See App. C 72-76. That is not what the 
court held. “The narrow question presented” was whether a statute gave a non-
Article III tribunal control over security clearance decisions within the executive 
branch. Egan, 484 U.S. at 520. The holding did not reach the power of Article III 
courts. The executive further states that the “claim of unilateral FISC power to 
override the Executive’s classification decisions is completely devoid of merit.” U.S. 
Reply Br. at 6. Cf U.S. Opening Br. at 20-22. This statement ignores the actual role 
that the judiciary regularly plays in scrutinizing classification determinations.  
A. The FISC is not unique in dealing with classified matters. 
 
Article III courts routinely confront classified material in the context of litigation. 
Hundreds of cases give rise to state secrets assertions, Exemption 1 claims under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), use of the Classified Information Procedures 
Act, and other efforts to keep the material from reaching the public domain. App. C 
                                                 
25 See United States’ Reply Brief at 6-7, In re: Certification of Questions of Law to 
the FISCR, No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Mar. 5, 2018) (hereinafter U.S. Reply Br.); 
Opening Brief for the United States at 20-22, In re: Certification of Questions of 
Law to the FISCR, No. 18-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Feb. 23, 2018) (hereinafter U.S. 
Opening Br.); United States' Opposition to the Motion of the ACLU for the Release 
of Court Records at 11-12, In re Opinions and Orders of this Court Containing Novel 
or Significant Interpretations of Law, No. Misc. 16-01 (FISA Ct. June 8, 2017); 
United States’ Legal Brief to the En Banc Court in Response to the Court’s Order of 
March 22, 2017 at 11 n.4, In re Opinions & Orders of this Court Addressing Bulk 
Collection of Data Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, No. Misc 13-
08 (FISA Ct. No. Apr. 17, 2017). 
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76-80. Between 2001 and 2009 alone, more than 100 cases involved state secrets 
privilege. App. C 77-78. They addressed a wide range of matters: breach of contract; 
patent disputes; trade secrets; fraud; employment termination; wrongful death and 
personal injury; negligence; allegations of torture; environmental degradation; 
breach of espionage contracts; defamation; criminal conduct; and constitutional 
violations. Id. Since 2009, courts have disposed of another 74 cases, dealing with 
everything from defamation, discrimination, personal injury, and wrongful death, to 
constitutional claims related to the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. Id. 
The government also makes broad use of Exemption 1. Id at 79. Since 1977, it has 
asserted it in at least 377 FOIA cases in the Courts of Appeals and the D.C. District 
Court. Id. This number is just a fraction of the total. Id. at n.27. In more than 50 
criminal cases, the courts have noted the discovery of classified information by 
defendants and in 89 cases procedures involving classified information. Id. at 79-80. 
B. Article III courts routinely scrutinize and at times reject Executive Branch 
classification determinations. 
 
Article III courts routinely scrutinize classified material to determine whether it 
should be made publicly available.26 In Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 
the court conducted a thorough “independent determination whether the information 
is privileged,” explaining, “We take very seriously our obligation to review the 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppensen DataPlan, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Moussaoui, 65 Fed. App’x. 881, 888 (4th Cir. 2003); App. C. 
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documents with a very careful, indeed a skeptical, eye, and not to accept at face value 
the government's claim or justification of privilege.” 507 F. 3d 1190, 1202-03 (9th 
Cir. 2007). In Hepting v. AT&T Corp., the executive had publicly discussed the 
program—similar to the current matter, where the government has acknowledged 
§215 metadata collection. “Because the government contends that the primary 
reasons for rejecting Plaintiffs’ arguments are set forth in the Government’s in 
camera, ex parte materials,” the Hepting court noted, “the court would be remiss not 
to consider those classified documents in determining whether this action is barred 
by the privilege.” Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-672 VRW, 2006 WL 1581965, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) (internal quotation and citation omitted).  
Examination of the Government’s claim must be done on an item by item basis, 
as “a court must not merely unthinkingly ratify the executive's assertion of absolute 
privilege, lest it inappropriately abandon its important judicial role.” In re U.S., 872 
F. 2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989). “In addressing challenges under the First 
Amendment . . . courts must keep in mind that ‘debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, 
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.’” 
Wright v. FBI, 613 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). Thus, while courts “must take seriously the 
government’s predictions about the security implications of releasing particular 
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information to the public,” ultimately a court “make[s] its own decision” about what 
material should, and should not, remain classified. ACLU v. FBI, 429 F. Supp. 2d 
179, 188 (D.D.C. 2006). Sometimes that means releasing information that the 
government would rather not see light of day.27 In New York Times v. United States, 
for instance, the Court refused to allow national security claims to override First 
Amendment rights. 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971). In Horn v. Huddle, Judge Royce 
Lamberth denied the government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege. 636 F. 
Supp. 2d 10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2009) vacated on other grounds, Horn v. Huddle, 699 
F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010). The court weighed whether the government had met 
the procedural requirements, the litigants’ need for the information in question, and 
the plausibility and substantiality of “the government’s allegations of danger to the 
national security.” Horn v. Huddle, 647 F.Supp. 2d 55, 56-57 (D.D.C. 2009) vacated 
on other grounds, 699 F. Supp. 2d 236. Lamberth concluded, “The deference 
generally granted the Executive Branch in matters of classification and national 
security must yield when the Executive attempts to exert control over the 
courtroom.” Huddle, 647 F.Supp. 2d at 65-66. These cases are not isolated. In 102 
of the 264 Exemption 1 FOIA cases that arose between 1977 and 2012 in the Courts 
of Appeals and the D.C. District Court, the court conducted in camera review. Forty-
                                                 
27 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); Rahman v. 
Chertoff, No. 05 C 3761, 2008 WL 4534407, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008); 
Hepting, 2006 WL 1581965 at *1; Jabra v. Kelly, 62 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Mich. 1974). 
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nine of these cases resulted in partial disclosure. App. C 89. A thirty-nine percent 
partial denial rate for in camera cases suggests that the judiciary does scrutinize 
Executive Branch claims. The burden is on the government to demonstrate that the 
material must be withheld. See Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 1999); 
DOJ v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993); App. C 89-90. 
C. The FISC should apply a test based on reasonableness, good faith, specificity, 
and plausibility. 
 
Insofar as the government claims that matters of law must remain hidden, the court 
should regard such claims as highly suspect. Rule of law requires that the law itself 
be known. As far as matters of fact are concerned, while the court may want to give 
the assertion from the government weight, the court is entirely within its rights as an 
Article III body to scrutinize such claims. See FISC Rule 62(a). A helpful standard 
to apply going forward comes from the D.C. Circuit: 
The test is not whether the court personally agrees in full with the [Executive 
Branch’s] evaluation of the danger—rather, the issue is whether on the whole record 
the Agency’s judgment objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good faith, 
specificity, and plausibility in this field of foreign intelligence in which the [agency] 
is expert and given by Congress a special role.  
 
Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This test is similar to that 
adopted in state secrets, prepublication, and CIPA cases, where the court considers 
whether the government has demonstrated a reasonable danger that disclosure would 
jeopardize national security and holds in camera, ex parte hearings to satisfy itself 
on the matter. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010). 



